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ESCALATOR CLAUSES IN PUBLIC UTILITY
RATE SCHEDULES
R. S. Trigg t
One of the major problems in public utility regulation is the
reconciliation of fixed rates to the pressures and demands of a fluctuat-
ing economy. Failure to make such a reconciliation results in unrea-
sonably high rates in periods of economic recession, and hardship to
the utility (in a few cases threatening discontinuance of service) during
inflationary cycles. These effects are the twin offspring of the in-
evitable lag between general price changes and regulatory approval
of changes in utility rates. The simplest and most widespread solution
of the problem is the use of automatic rate adjustments, whereby the
rates are allowed to vary automatically with changes in operating costs,
prices of basic raw materials, or independently-published price indices.
This type of rate adjustment apparently originated during the first
world war.' The first cases in which such provisions were considered
by state regulatory agencies were decided in 1917.2 The Pennsylvania
Public Service Commission referred to them as unusual in 1918,' and
the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities ruled that it would
not during wartime sanction such a complete departure from prior
practice.4 In spite of such administrative conservatism, the plan spread.
By the middle 1920's it was a recognized and widely accepted method
of utility rate-making, and the spate of administrative proceedings in-
volving addition of such clauses to existing rate structures showed a
marked decline. The Public Utility Reports series included only two
or three decisions on the subject in the period 1924-1932, and only
two between 1933 and 1940.
One of the latter two decisions marked a new departure. In the
first decade of automatic rate revision, the basis for all such rate
changes was variation in the price of fuel. This was and is the primary
expense item for electric utilities. It was the logical choice for the
t Member, Philadelphia and Pennsylvania Bars; LL.B., University of Pennsyl-
vania, 1951.
1. Uniform Fuel Clauses for Electric Companies, MASs. D'T o1 PuB. U~rlL. No.
7357 (1946).
2. Alton Gas & Elec. Co., 1917F P.U.R. 12 (IL1.).
3. Mercer County Light, Heat & Power Co., 1919A P.U.R. 907.
4. Plymouth Gaslight Co., 1919A P.U.R. 339 (1918). For the history of such
clauses in California, see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 82 P.U.R. (n.s.) 473, 488 (1949).
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bellwether for the additional reasons that it rose in price quite rapidly
during the war period and its price was not subject to control by the
utilities. In 1933 another type of expense showed signs of rapid
increase as the New Deal presaged new and increased taxes. One
utility sought to shift this burden to its customers by an automatic
rate adjustment clause, but the regulatory agency disapproved.
"While the constantly increasing burden of taxation upon
public utility service must necessarily be handed on to the user
of public utility service, the Commission is of the belief that the
amount of such burden in comparison with the other costs of
furnishing utility service has not yet increased to such an extent
as to justify the imposition of a clause in the rate schedule which
automatically shifts this burden to the consumer. . .
The second world war, with its swift inflationary spiral, again
brought automatic rates to the fore, although it must not be inferred
that they had disappeared from rate structures between the two wars.
In the past fifteen years, they have been shown to be an effective means
of easing the regulatory burden without lifting any measure of regula-
tory control, and they have been extended to a broader basis, covering
fuel prices, and in certain cases other expenses. Refinements have also
been introduced to make them more sensitive to changed conditions
both within the utility and in the economy as a whole.6
Today utility rates in almost every state can and do fluctuate from
month to month, with no fanfare and frequently no litigation. If this
is not contrary to the regulatory statutes, it certainly is not what was
anticipated by the draftsmen of those statutes. In view of this, it would
be logical to expect that the legal issues involved stlould have been
thoroughly debated as the variable rates became more and more familiar.
What development of legal concepts could affect more individual pocket-
books? Yet the facf is that the legal and practical problems involved
in escalation of utility rates have received so little public attention that
their logical ultimate development remains unrecognized, unutilized,
and virtually unimagined.
PURPOSES OF ESCALATOR CLAUSES
In their inception, fuel clauses were designed solely to protect the
utility's rate of return during an inflationary period; even the correla-
5. Newport Water Corp., 1933E P.U.R. 1, 25 (RI.).
6. Since the early clauses were all concerned with fuel prices, this type of rate ad-
justment came to be known as a "fuel clause"; with the general adoption of similar
provisions for increased tax burdens the term "tax adjustment" was adopted. Occa-
sionally in the decided cases, and frequently herein, the term "escalator clause& is
used to refer to both types, and also to include the clauses which are based on factors
other than fuel or taxes.
19581
966 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
tive protection to the consumer in times of recession was probably
mere window-dressing in order to make the effects of such a clause more
palatable to the regulatory agencies. Later, the advantages of such a
provision from a competitive viewpoint received some notice. This
was particularly true in the adoption of the clauses by gas distributors,
faced with competition by oil interests. The latter, being unregulated,
could reduce prices quickly during slack seasons. In the struggle to
retain customers who could easily switch to oil, the ability to meet
reductions in oil prices as they occurred and thus maintain from month
to month the competitive price relationship between the two fuels
became of paramount importance. Accordingly, some gas utilities pub-
lished schedules providing that gas rates would be adjusted in accord-
ance with fluctuations in the price of oil.
7
The same considerations affect, to a lesser extent, the rate struc-
tures of electric utilities as to customers in a position to construct their
own generating plants; but since private generation of electricity is
relatively uncommon, this type of escalator has not met with widespread
approval.8 In fact, the use of escalator clauses for competitive purposes
by any type of utility has been openly sanctioned in only two states and
Hawaii.'
The reluctance of the commissions to authorize this type of rate is
clearly justified. The effect of such a rate is to allow increased charges
because the customer is under economic duress, and reductions when
forced by competition. At the time of the increase, no consideration
is given to the utility's rate of return; nor to the relationship between
rates to be increased and those to remain unchanged; nor, in fact, to
the customers' ability (as distinguished from economic necessity) to
pay. A regulatory commission which approves a rate of this kind is
coming dangerously close to an abdication of its functions, and effecting
indirectly a pro tanto repeal of the regulatory legislation.
The California Public Utilities Commission has devised one
safeguard on such a rate. A reasonable rate is first established, after
which fluctuation is allowed in order to maintain a prescribed relation-
ship to competitive fuels. This fluctuation, however, may not be so
applied as to result in a rate higher than the established reasonable
level. The rate may decrease, and it may increase back to the original
7. See notes 79, 80 infra.
8. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 161, 205 (Cal. 1954).
9. Southern Counties Gas Co., 1 P.U.R.3d 475, 497 (Cal. 1953); Southern Cal.
Gas Co., 87 P.U.RL (n.s.) 492, 514 (Cal. 1950); Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp., 65
P.U.R. (as.) 198, 201 (Wis. 1946); Wisconsin-Michigan Power Co., 76 P.U.R. (n.s.)
153 (Wis. 1948); Northern States Power Co., Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n No. 2-U-2781
(1948) ; Hawaiian Elec. Co., Hawaii Pub. Util. Comm'n No. 841, Exhibit A, Schedule
A, at 2 (1955). For an unusual application of this principle, see Southern Cal. Gas
Co., 1922A P.U.R. 536 (Cal. 1921).
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level, thus compensating for prior decreases; but further increases are
not permitted.' This alleviates, but does not completely cure, the ills
mentioned above which a competitive escalation involves.
The primary purpose of escalator clauses, as stated, is to protect
the utility's rate of return during inflationary periods. At such times,
the normal procedures involved in rate increases are unsatisfactory, in-
volving as they inevitably do delays of months or even years. The
point was admirably demonstrated before the Virginia State Corpora-
tion Commission, when escalator clauses were proposed by seven gas
utilities, all of which purchased natural gas from the same source.
Commissioner Catterall said in that case:
"When prices are rising, the time that necessarily elapses
between the date when earnings fall below the permissible minimum
rate of return and the date when the commission enters its order
allowing increased rates, is a time during which the utility earns
less than a fair and reasonable return..
"The inevitable delay between the happening of an event
that entitles a party to legal relief and the date when he gets
relief makes it impossible in some kinds of cases for law and
equity to do complete justice. Ever since Hamlet mentioned 'the
law's delay' as one of the things that made him wonder whether
it was better 'to be or not to be,' lawyers and legislators have
sought ways of overcoming so far as possible the time lag in the
machinery of justice. One purpose of the fuel clause in electric
rate schedules and the escalator clause in natural gas rate schedules
is to keep the mere lapse of time from operating in favor of or
against either the stockholders or the consumers. The time
factor is especially prominent in the cases before us because, since
all seven distribution companies receive their gas through the
pipelines of the same transmission company, all seven would start
paying the changed purchase price on the same day. In the
absence of an escalator clause, each of the seven companies would,
if the increase were substantial, file new schedules. In order to
hold hearings on the proposed increases in rates, the commission's
staff would have to examine the books and records of seven com-
panies. One company might get relief in two months and another
company might not get relief for ten months. The company whose
case was heard last would suffer unjustly compared to the com-
panies whose cases were heard earlier, and it would be physically
impossible to avoid that injustice. If there should be a substantial
decrease in the wholesale price, the customers of the seventh
company would suffer the largest injustice. There is no rule of
law or justice for determining which of the seven applications
should be investigated and heard first or last. The denial of the
10. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 87 P.U.R. (n.s.) 492, 515 (Cal. 1950).
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present applications might create a situation in which it would be
physically impossible for the commission to render equal justice
to all parties, because to public utility rate cases the maxim
'justice delayed is justice denied' is particularly applicable.""
CONTENTIONS PRO AND CON
The objections which greeted the first escalation proposals have
been heard and answered, and rejected by some state legislatures as
well as the vast majority of regulatory commissions.' 2 Yet the ob-
jections are still heard, and are occasionally still upheld.'3
Aside from the universal desire to pay as little as possible for any
service, the principal economic objection to escalation is its effect on
the consumer's pricing policies. Where an article is offered for sale
at a fixed price, computed on the known costs of production, a frequent
fluctuation in production costs may throw the entire cost-price relation-
ship off balance. In such a situation, a manufacturer may find himself
operating at a loss because of unexpected, and in some cases retroactive,
increases in utility charges.
The objection, however, is more theoretical than real. It may
have some validity at the time the utility first adopts an escalator clause;
but a slight revision of the utility consumer's pricing policy will nor-
mally prevent any further hardship. The best example of such a
revision is the case of the Lynchburg Gas Company. When its primary
supplier, also a utility, adopted an escalator clause, Lynchburg quickly
did the same thing, thus protecting itself from any future loss. 4 A
manufacturer, it should be remembered, can alter prices much more
readily than a utility, because the utility faces the necessity of obtaining
prior governmental approval. It might also be noted that fluctuation
in production costs is becoming increasingly common in our economy,
as exemplified by long-term wage agreements providing for adjustments
based on various commodity price indices. Perhaps this helps to
explain why this particular argument, which defeated some escalator
11. Lynchburg Gas Co., 6 P.U.IL3d 33, 35-36 (Va. 1954), additional opinionz sub
nom. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 7 P.U.R.3d 108 (Va. 1954), aff'd sub nom. Norfolk
v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 90 S.E.2d 140 (1955).
12. For legislation specifically authorizing escalation, see, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 40-368 (1956); N.Y. PUB. Srav. LAw § 65(4); OHIo R~v. CoDE ANN. §
4905.31 (Anderson 1953).
13. Portland Gas Light Co., 69 P.U.R. (n.s.) 154 (Me. 1947); Southern Utah
Power Co., 93 P.U.R. (n.s.) 325 (Utah 1952) ; Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 13 P.U.R.3d
523 (Wyo. 1956). The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities even while ap-
proving an escalation proposal expressed itself as "generally reluctant" to do so.
Worcester Gas Light Co., 9 P.U.R.3d 152, 155 (1955).
14. See note 11 supra.
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proposals in the first decade of their development,' has not received
significant attention in the opinions of the past twenty years.
Further objection is raised that if a utility can automatically in-
crease its rates when its costs rise, the utility loses the incentive to
make reductions in costs, which reductions would eventually benefit the
consumer."0 This argument contains just enough truth to sound
convincing; actually it is so oversimplified as to be almost totally
erroneous. To begin with, many escalator clauses, particularly those
based on fuel costs, apply only to certain classes of customers (either
industrial, or industrial and commercial, or all but the class paying the
highest rate for the initial block of energy).'7 There is usually also a
moderate lag between the time the utility pays the increased cost and
the reflection of that cost in billing. Furthermore, an escalator formula
may be so constructed as to pass on to the consumers somewhat less
than the full increase paid by the utility. All these factors mean that
the utility must still bear some part of the increase. Even if that were
not true, there are other incentives to economy. Rare indeed is the
enterprise-even among public utilities-without some form of com-
petition limiting its ability to ignore costs; and the improvident utility
management is also subject to censure or stronger remedies admin-
istered by governmental regulators.
The purely legal objections to escalation fall into two groups. The
first is based on the regulatory process itself; the second arises from
the almost universal requirement of published tariffs.
The first group involves three logically separate contentions, which
are almost invariably so intertwined in the agency opinions that their
separation for analysis is quite difficult if not, at times, impossible. Of
these, the most sweeping is that approval of escalator clauses prevents
subsequent supervision of the utility rates or rate structure. The
California Public Utilities Commission gave voice to this argument
in Southern Cal. Gas Co.:
"In the past the automatic action of the present form of fuel
escalator clause in the interruptible rate has virtually taken out of
the Commission's hands the control of the level of the rate. At
times it has appeared to the Commission that an automatic change
in the price of gas when the price of oil changed was not war-
ranted." 18
To alleviate this situation the Commission required that fuel clauses
published thereafter should expressly show that the escalation would
15. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 1918E P.U.R. 490, 509 (Mo.); H.J.M. Jones,
1921D P.U.R. 145, 150 (Vt.).
16. Utah Power & Light Co., 95 P.U.R. (as.) 390, 399 (Utah 1952).
17. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 1918E P.U.R. 490, 508 (Mo.).
18. 99 P.U.R. (ns.) 272, 287 (1952).
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be subject "to any revisory action that may be deemed necessary in
the public interest by the California Public Utilities Commission in the
exercise of its jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of law and the
rules and regulations of said Commission." 19
The Maine Public Utilities Commission is even more conservative,
fearing that if it approved of escalation "we doubt that we should
be properly discharging our public duty. . . . [Escalation] calls for
a delegation of the public responsibility of this Commission to the
utility. Although it is permissive in character and subject to recall,
it is nevertheless effective." o The last sentence quoted is a close
paraphrase of the position taken by the Illinois Public Utilities Com-
mission in an early case,2 ' but oddly enough the latter Commission had
approved an escalator clause only a month previously.'
The California Commission's action outlined above is in itself a
sufficient answer to this argument.' Massachusetts has provided another
answer, by suspending increases announced by the utility pursuant to
a previously-approved escalator clause.' And the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals gave still a third, pointing out that any person who
believed the rates as increased by escalation to be unreasonable could
file a complaint with the Commission 4 Escalation, in short, has no
effect on the powers of the regulatory agency; it is a remedial measure
only, designed to prevent in part the evils resulting from the delays
inherent in the administrative process.
The next of this group of objections, in order of frequency of
assertion, is that escalator clauses permit rates to be increased, above
what had been previously accepted as a reasonable level, without con-
sideration of all factors which should be examined in determining the
reasonableness of a rate. For example, the Massachusetts Department
of Public Utilities, even while approving a fuel clause, warned that
"increases in cost generally must be studied, not as an individual
item but as a portion of the over-all costs of the utility incurred in doing
business." 25 The Maine Public Utilities Commission, although pro-
hibited by the state's Supreme Judicial Court from approving any
escalator clause," volunteered the opinion that in approving any rate
19. Ibid.
20. Portland Gas Light Co., 69 P.U.R. (n.s.) 154, 157 (1947).
21. Rockford Elec. Co., 1917F P.U.R. 196.
22. Alton Gas & Elec. Co., 1917F P.U.R. 12. See also Public Serv. Co., 1924B
P.U.R. 386 (Ill. 1924).
23. Worcester Light Co., 9 P.U.R.3d 152 (1955). The opinion even leaves some
doubt whether a tariff supplement or merely a letter of notice had been filed.
24. Norfolk v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 518, 90 S.E.2d 140, 149
(1955).
25. Worcester Gas Light Co., 9 P.U.R.3d 152, 155 (1955).
26. Or so the Commission interpreted In re Caribou Water, Light & Power Co.,
121 Me. 426, 117 Atl. 579 (1922).
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increase all factors entering into rate-making should ,be considered,
since while fuel costs are increasing other costs might decrease and
thus result in a net decline in the utility's operating costs.
2 7
This argument is valid only in exceptional economic circumstances.
Generally speaking, prices fluctuate similarly to other prices. Whether
the general trend is inflationary or recessive, all prices tend to move in
the same direction. There are exceptions, of course; but these normally
involve commodities or services either relatively new or approaching
obsolescence, whose position in the economy is unfixed. A recent
example is the price of television sets during the middle 1940's. But
the supposition that one major cost factor will fluctuate in direct op-
position to the current norm is unrealistic, and the agencies which have
allowed this possibility to frighten them are either economically naive
or are adopting a specious rationale to cloak the real reasons for their
decisions.
Concededly there may be occasions when a given escalator formula
will overcompensate for the experienced cost increases, where the
increases in costs made part of the formula are proportionately greater
than other increases incurred by the utility. But the overcompensation
will in all probability be less than the opposite effect which results from
rigid rate structures, since the utility is overcompensated only to the
extent that its other costs rise at a slower rate than its accelerated costs,
while, when there is no escalation, the utility is undercompensated by
the sum of all price rises. And in such cases there is always a remedy
available-either regulatory suspension of the rate changes resulting
from escalation at a given time, or complaint by a consumer as to the
reasonableness of the resulting rates.
The third objection in this group perhaps stems from these very
remedies. It is said that the effect of escalation is to shift the burden of
proving the reasonableness or unreasonableness of particular rates
"from the utility where it legally belongs, to the Commission where it
does not belong," 2s or to the consumer. This is the easiest of the
arguments to answer. The Natural Gas Act provides that "at any
hearing involving a rate or charge sought to be increased, the burden of
proof to show that the increased rate or charge is just and reasonable
shall be upon the natural-gas company.. ,, 29 The Federal Power
Act contains identical language, except that "public utility" is sub-
stituted for "natural-gas company." " Virtually all the state regulatory
27. Portland Gas Light Co., 69 P.U.R. (us.) 154, 157 (Me. 1947).
28. Ibid.; see also Rockford Elec. Co., 1917F P.U.R. 196 (Ill.); Georgia Power
Co., Ga. Pub. Serv. Comnm'n No. 466-U, at 3 (March 23, 1953).
29. 52 STAT. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1952).
30. 49 STAT. 852 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §824d(e) (1952).
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acts have similar if not identical provisions. Thus, upon filing of an
automatic rate increase, if the Commission doubts that the resulting
rates would be just and reasonable, it may suspend the rates. In any
further proceeding on the propriety of such increases, the burden of
proof to show that such rates will be just and reasonable shall be upon
the proponent utility. Considerations with regard to burden of proof
in instances where rates are increased by operation of an escalator
clause are, therefore, the same as they are in instances where the rate
is increased by the filing of a new tariff; and the position of the parties
with respect to burden of proof is likewise the same in each situation.
Again, the administrative agencies which adopt such arguments are
using them to cloak the real reasons for their decisions.
These legal objections are frequently confused in the decisions, to
such an extent that they often appear as only one argument. The
remaining contention is always separately stated, since it bears less
on the political-philosophical and more on the practical aspects of the
arrangement. It involves the principle that public utility rates should
be published and definite. This may be divided, for purposes of analy-
sis, into two parts: the stability of the rates, and the method of
publication of those rates. The latter problem is significant enough to
warrant separate treatment; only the issue of stability will be discussed
at this point.
The Illinois authorities were among the first to espouse the stability
of rates:
"The supplement herein proposed contemplates that the rates
for service shall not be determined until the end of the month in
which the service is rendered, and that these rates will be affected
by the cost of coal during that month. . . . [I]t is apparent that
the Commission would not be in a position to determine from the
schedule as filed what the present charges for service furnished or
to be furnished . . . are, since it would have no definite knowl-
edge of what the price of coal was to be during the month in
consideration, even though that month might be the current
month." "1
Numerous commissions were concerned as to the consumers'
ability to understand the rates charged under escalator clauses. In the
early days of escalation, the New Jersey Board of Public Utility Com-
missioners refused to approve a clause based on the price of gas oil
for this reason,' although they had previously permitted a coal clause
which applied only to large industrial users who could understand the
31. Rockford Elec. Co., 1917F P.U.R. 196, 199.
32. Public Serv. Gas Co., 1920E P.U.R. 396.
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principle involved.P New York's Public Service Commission reached
the same conclusion.
"Applied to . . large consumers, with officials having
the information and experience necessary to calculate their ex-
penses with this clause in view, such rates have not been the
subject of complaint, and it must be assumed that they have
operated equitably and to the satisfaction of the electrical corpora-
tions and the consumers as well. Whether they should be applied
to the great mass of consumers may not present a different legal
question, but certainly presents an entirely different problem as
to justice and expediency. . . . While the result might not be
unjust to the permanent consumer . ."., the very uncertainty
would be bound to cause discontent and suspicion." '
In recent years this argument has met with decreasing success.s5
It was followed in Georgia in 1948,36 but the New York and Utah
commissions have recognized the problem and nonetheless approved
escalator clauses applicable to all classes of consumers. 7  In fact, after
almost forty years' experience in its operation, it can be said that
escalation has proved successful, and has not borne out the dire predic-
tions of its foes.
Today, the vast majority of electric utilities use fuel clauses.
38
Such clauses have been incorporated in retail electric rate tariffs in
forty-four states; tax adjustment clauses have been adopted in thirty-
four, including the four where fuel clauses are not extant (although
in many of these thirty-four states no charges have been imposed
under the tax clauses). In seven states where electric utilities are
subject to state regulation, and in two where such regulation is not
imposed, escalator clauses have appeared which are based on changes
in costs other than fuel and taxes."9 Interestingly enough, the four
states where no fuel clauses have been adopted are Idaho, Montana,
Oregon, and Washington-an area where hydroelectric generation
would necessarily enter any computation of fuel clauses, and probably
into the competitive considerations preceding a utility's decision to
propose them; no decision of any of these jurisdictions has been found
rejecting a fuel clause. Conversely, fuel clauses are included in the
33. Atlantic County Elec. Co., 1918B P.U.R. 589, 592.
34. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 1921A P.U.R. 415, 417-18.
35. See text at notes 43-46 infra.
36. Georgia Power & Light Co., 74 P.U.R. (n.s.) 69, 78.
37. New York Edison Co., 10 P.U.R. (n.s.) 244, 260-62 (N.Y. 1935); Southern
Utah Power Co., 77 P.U.R. (is.) 109 (Utah 1949).
38. See Duke Power Co., 75 P.U.R. (n.s.) 33 (N.C. 1948): "[A]nalysis of
100 of the largest power companies in the country shows that 86 have fuel clauses."
39. Retail rate schedules shown in FPC, NATIONAL ELmcnIc RAtLi Boox (1956).
Jurisdiction of regulatory agencies based on MooDy, Punuc UTini~Zs (1955).
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tariffs of two large electric utilities in Maine, notwithstanding their
condemnation by both court and commission:' Each of the jurisdic-
tions whose objections to escalation are quoted or cited herein has
approved of the method in some form.'
TYPES OF FUEL CLAUSES
Examination of fuel clauses presently included in retail electric
rate schedules establishes a great variety of factors entering into their
application.' Such clauses are so varied that rarely, if ever, can any
generalizations be made concerning any particular factor.
This may best be shown with reference to the classes of consumers
whose rates may be escalated. The early clauses applied only to large
consumers, apparently at the request of the utilities, who feared that the
cost of billing residential consumers for the additional charges would
be more than the resulting revenue.4 This factor is still given consid-
erable weight,"4 but it is not as controlling as it once was, perhaps
because of the increased efficiency of billing operations mechanically
performed. In several more recent cases utilities have requested exten-
sion of existing clauses to smaller customers, 45 and such requests are
frequently approved in order to remove the stigma of discrimination
against large users of utility service. 6
There are other aspects of this problem of discrimination which
merit attention. It has been said, for example, that escalation of in-
dustrial rates without similar escalation of residential rates is not
discriminatory, inasmuch as the industrial user is still paying only the
increased cost of fuel burned in generating electricity used by him-he
is not asked to contribute to the increased cost attributable to residential
useY.4  The utility absorbs the latter portion of the cost increases, rather
than incur the expense of billing small surcharges. This is not com-
pletely true, however, since as the utility absorbs the increase in cost,
40. In re Caribou Water, Light & Power Co., 121 Me. 426, 117 At. 579 (1922);
Portland Gas Light Co., 69 P.U.R. (n.s.) 154 (Me. 1947).
41. Except possibly Rhode Island, as to which no favorable decision has been found
although both fuel and tax clauses are known to be extant within the state.
42. The statistics in this section are compiled from examination of FPC, NATIONAL
ELcTRic RAT4 Boox (1956). Where unusual features are mentioned, reference to the
particular schedule is by state, utility company, and Rate Book schedule number. The
schedule numbers relate to the Rate Book as published during 1956, and may vary
in subsequent additions.
43. Union Elec. Light and Power Co., 1918E P.U.R. 490, 507 (Mo.).
44. New York Edison Co., 10 P.U.R. (n.s) 244, 260 (N.Y. 1935).
45. New Haven Gas Light Co., 70 P.U.R. (n.s.) 187 (Conn. 1947); Springfield
Gas Light Co., 70 P.U.R. (n.s.) 82 (Mass. 1947).
-46. Ibid; Hartford Elec. Light Co., 95 P.U.R. (n.s.) 161, 176 (Conn. 1952).
Contra, New York Edison Co., 10 P.U.R. (n.s.) 244, 260 (N.Y. 1935).
47. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 1918E P.U.R. 490, 507 (Mo.).
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for fuel allocated to small consumers, it necessarily enlarges the pro-
portional contribution of industrial customers to its overall rate of
return. Thus, although escalation applied only to a limited class in this
manner is prima facie not discriminatory, to the extent that the utility
must pass along the absorbed cost increases to the industrial consumer
it tends to become discriminatory.
'W'hen rates have been fixed for all classes of service with
due consideration for equitable relationship between classes, such
relationship cannot be maintained if one class be required to bear
the entire burden of an increase in cost which affects the service
of all classes." 4s
Even so, the discrimination is not ipso facto unreasonable. Large
power consumers universally pay less per unit of power than do small
consumers; thus (assuming that the same amount of fuel is required to
produce a given unit of power regardless of the eventual user of that
unit) the proportion of the rate attributable to fuel costs is much
greater for the large customer than for the small.49 The classification,
then, and the escalation of some but not all rates, is not necessarily
unreasonable.' °
In some cases the determination to exempt residential customers
from escalator increases is based on facts completely unique to the
individual utility.' For example, the New Mexico Public Service Com-
mission, while approving such a clause for application to industrial
users, refused to allow it as applied to commercial and residential serv-
ice, on the ground that the rates in these schedules were already higher
than rates for comparable service in surrounding areas."1
Again, the decision to exempt residential service, particularly if
made by the Commission contrary to the request of the utility, may be
based on the lesser ability of the residential customer to understand
a month-to-month variation in the rate at which he is billed. 2
Thus the battle rages. The reported decisions would appear to
indicate that only a minority of regulatory bodies permit escalation as
applied to residential service; but this appearance is somewhat exag-
48. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 61 P.U.R. (n.s.) 94, 103 (Md.
1945).
49. Because of this, one case held a fuel clause applicable to all classes of con-
sumers was a discrimination against residential consumers. Bridgeton Elec. Co., 1917F
P.U.R. 205 (N.J. 1917).
50. Detroit Edison Co., 78 P.U.R. (n.s.) 360, 378 (Mich. 1949); Union Elec.
Light & Power Co., 1918E P.U.R. 490, 507 (Mo.).
51. Community Pub. Serv. Co., 93 P.U.R. (n.s.) 18 (1951).
52. Georgia Power & Light Co., 74 P.U.R. (n.s.) 69, 78 (Ga. 1948) ; Public Serv.
Gas Co., 1920E P.U.R. 396 (N.J.); cf. Southern Utah Power Co., 77 P.U.R. (n.s.)
109 (Utah 1949) and cases cited notes 32-34 supra.
19581
976 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
gerated, apparently by the selection of opinions to be published. Actually
fuel clauses applicable to residential users exist in seventeen of the
thirty-eight states exercising regulatory jurisdiction over electric utility
rates and allowing fuel clauses in any form. Each of the seventeen,
incidentally, has other fuel clauses which are not applicable to residential
service.
Another factor in fuel clauses as to which significant variations
appear both within and among the jurisdictions is that relating to
experience. This factor is closely related to the original purpose for
fuel clauses. Elimination of the administrative time lag would be of but
little advantage if the method of elimination embodied an equivalent lag
of its own. Yet virtually all of the fuel clauses presently in use contain
a built-in time lag, ranging from a month to a year or more. (The vast
majority of tax clauses, on the other hand, are so drafted as to
eliminate this delay.)
The justifications for such a factor do not appear in the opinions,
but they are easily imagined. To begin with, the prevalence of an
experience period of a year must be based in part on seasonal fluctua-
tions in efficiency or fuel prices or both, which may be taken into con-
sideration in order to avoid excessive fluctuation in rates. In the
second place, the varying efficiency of production units makes it neces-
sary to use average costs, and a period of time is essential to determina-
tion of the average." Thus the minimum lag is designed to allow for
collection of data on which the adjustment is based, calculation of the
exact rate of adjustment, and notice to consumers and commissions.
Thirdly, in some cases the regulatory agencies require that no change be
effected until a succeeding billing period, on the theory that a utility
may charge a higher rate only for service rendered after notice of the
rate increase is given to the public.
The first two explanations, it will be noted, are practical rather
than legal, and therefore probably stem as much from utility preference
as from commission imposition. The third, being a legal principle, may
arise from either source. But the surprising aspect of this experience
factor problem is not the source of the provision; it is the complete lack
of uniformity, or even of any recognizable pattern.
It has previously been pointed out that every jurisdiction which
allows fuel clauses to be applied in residential service also allows such
clauses which are not so applied. Similar statements can be made with
reference to experience factors. Of the forty-eight states six have no
regulation of electric utility rates; in four others no fuel clauses are
53. Propriety of Fuel Clauses, MAss. DEPT OF PuB. UI.. No. 7357 (1946).
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presently applicable. In at least thirty-three of the remaining thirty-
eight states, more than one experience factor is presently in use in
computing fuel adjustments. 4
The variety of experience factors in use in a few states will serve
to emphasize the lack of uniformity. For example, Pennsylvania utili-
ties use the average cost of power over a three-month period, 5 or during
the second month preceding the billing month,6 or the calendar month
immediately preceding the billing month,57 or during the preceding
calendar year." In Missouri, it may be the preceding month, 9 or
twelve months,' or three months,"' or the preceding month with pro-
vision for deferred billing; 62 or the experience factor may not appear
in the rate schedule.' Illinois companies use the average for twelve
months ending with the second month preceding the billing month,"
or the six months ending at the same'time,l or the earliest three of the
next prior five months,.6 or two calendar months immediately preceding
the billing period, 7 or the preceding month. 8 Connecticut schedules
include the average price of "fuel burned in the month," 69 and the
average for a calendar quarter,7 0 and for the second preceding month,71
and for no stated length of time.72 The variations in use in Connecticut
are particularly interesting. In 1944 the state's Public Utilities Com-
mission proposed a uniform fuel clause, embracing a five-year average
price of fuel; in the ensuing investigation, the utilities objected to this
and proposed a one-year basis. The Commission accepted this modi-
fication in its decision, but neglected to mention any experience factor
in the order; I and apparently the omission has resulted in Connecticut
54. In two other states more than one experience factor may be in use, but the
factor is not indicated in FPC, NAIONA. ELmCTmc RA Booi, and correspondence
with the utility has failed to establish sufficient information to determine whether
differing factors are applied.
55. Pa., Philadelphia Elec. Co., 93.
56. Pa., Cumberland Valley Elec. Co., 21.
57. Pa., Borough of Chambersburg, 166.
58. Pa., Grove City Municipal Elec. Plant, 184.
59. Mo., Arkansas-Missouri Power Co., 7.
60. Mo., Kansas City Power & Light Co., 42.
61. Mo., Missouri Pub. Serv. Co., 117.
62. Mo., Empire Dist. Elec. Co., 32.
63. Mo., Jackson Water & Light Dep't, 278.
64. Ill., Central Ill. Elec. & Gas Co., 1.
65. Ill., Central Ill. Light Co., 18.
66. Ill., Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 46.
67. I1., Illinois Power Co., 113.
68. Ill., Northwestern Ill. Gas & Elec. Co., 160. In practice this has the same effect
as the clause referred to at note 64 supra. Letter from E. M. Nicholson, Interstate
Power Co., to author, Jan. 24, 1957.
69. Conn., Connecticut Light & Power Co., 1.
70. Conn., Housatonic Pub. Serv. Co., 107.
71. Conn., Mystic Power Co., 126.
72. Conn., Connecticut Power Co., 13.
73. Uniform Fuel Clause for All Electric Companies, 54 P.U.R. (n.s.) 57 (Conn.
1944).
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being today in the forefront of those states whose rate schedules are
least uniform as to this factor.
Certain types of experience provision merit further comment.
The first is the type, referred to above as in use in Missouri and
Connecticut, but not uncommon elsewhere, in which the experience
factor is not stated. It may be implied, as in the following provision:
"The energy charge will be increased or decreased 0.015 per
kwh for each 20, or major fraction thereof, increase or decrease
in the weighted average cost of coal, delivered in the cars to the
siding at the utility's generating stations above or below $4.50 per
net ton having a heating value of 12,750 Btu per lb. 'dry.' " 7
Or the provision may be so worded as to be ambiguous, for example:
"The energy charge will be increased 0.00120 per kwh for each 10
variation in the cost of coal delivered to utility above or below $3.70
per net ton." 7" The latter clause may use "cost" to refer to average
cost over an undefined period, but it could also be interpreted as a
reference to spot price at the time the rate of adjustment is calculated.
There would be no question of the proper interpretation of the
last-quoted provision, if all unambiguous fuel clauses contained an ex-
perience factor. In that event it would be presumed that an experience
period would be used to determine "cost." But in some cases the clauses
specifically refer to spot prices. One New York utility, for example,
refers to the price of bituminous coal "at the utility's . . . generating
station as of the 1st day of the month in which the billing cycle com-
mences." 76 A clause in use in Vermont refers to delivered cost of
fuel oil "for the preceding month or the last date of purchase whichever
shall be the later." 71 In California the adjustment is determined by the
price of oil "as regularly quoted by the Standard Oil Co. of Cali-
fornia"; "S gas tariffs have a similar provision except that they are
governed by the lowest quotation posted by any of three oil companies.79
The Hawaii Public Utilities Commission approved a clause stating that
"the cost of fuel oil prevailing on the 15th day of the calendar month
immediately preceding the month in which the bill is rendered shall be
used in computing the amount of such adjustment." o
74. Wis., Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 78. (Emphasis added.)
75. Utah, Southern Utah Power Co., 7; see also Ariz., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 2.
76. N.Y., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 4.
77. Vt., Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 10.
78. Cal., California Elec. Power Co., 12.
79. See Southern Cal. Gas Co., Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n No. 44741 (1950).
80. Hawaiian Elec. Co., Hawaii Pub. Util. Comm'n No. 841, Exhibit A, Schedule
A, at 2 (1955).
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Thus experience factors, though almost universally accepted, are
not essential to the operation of a fuel clause; they are merely a means
of determining, more or less arbitrarily,"' the cost of fuel to the utility.
They have been criticized as allowing future patrons to pay for the
utility's past operating expenses,8 but this is to some extent probably
unavoidable as long as rates may not be legally changed retroactively s5
However, in keeping with their primary purpose, the tendency is to
permit reduction in the time involved. For example, the Arkansas
Public Service Commission recently authorized an existing fuel clause
to be changed substituting for a twelve-month average cost the average
cost for the second preceding month.'
In view of the practical considerations involved, lack of uniformity
might be expected in experience factors. By the same token, the practice
with regard to prompt-payment discounts should logically be completely
consistent. Fuel clauses are theoretically so constructed as to com-
pensate for increased fuel costs, and no more; if a discount is allowed
on this portion of the bill, the utility either obtains a windfall from
each late-paying customer, or does not regain as much from the clause
as it logically should. For this reason, most utilities provide that the
fuel clause adjustment shall not be subject to any discount.' But
there are a few which disregard the logic of the matter, and allow a
discount on the entire bill."'
The determination of the appropriate base price to be included in
the clause merits more consideration than it has received in published
opinions. This determination falls into two parts: the period of time
to be used, and the proper price relationship existing during that period,
which is adopted as the measure of escalation. Normally the period of
time chosen is one which is both recent and representative-the latter
requiring a period of relatively stable fuel prices. But the fact that the
base period initially chosen is normally quite recent does not indicate
any necessity for maintaining the formula on an up-to-date basis. Thus,
one utility retained its original base price for two decades, without
81. Propriety of Fuel Clauses, MASS. Dt'T OF Pum. UTm. No. 7357 (1946). Glenns
Falls Portland Cement Co. v. New York Power & Light Corp., 69 P.U.R. (n.s.) 37
(N.Y. 1947).
82. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 1921A P.U.R. 415, 430 (N.Y.) (dissenting
opinion).
83. Cf. Rockford Elec. Co., 1917F P.U.R. 196 (Il.).
84. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 13 P.U.R.3d 1, 20 (1956). This approach ap-
pears to be the best reconciliation of the conflicting factors which must be recognized in
fixing an experience level, including the need to discount sudden or temporary cost
changes, the desirability of maintaining the base for escalation on as nearly a current
basis as possible, and the need to avoid the delays inherent in full administrative hear-
ings prior to a change in the cost basis for the escalation.
85. E.g., Pa., Cumberland Valley Elec. Co., 21.
86. E.g., Ohio, Marietta Elec. Co., 105.
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incurring regulatory displeasure87 The base period should be changed,
however, with sufficient frequency to account for substantial changes in
system efficiency.8
Even these changes, however, may be avoided if the base price is
stated in terms of a relationship which takes efficiency into account. In
the case of electric rates, this can be done by using as a base the price
per kilowatt hour, rather than the price per unit of fuel. Clauses using
relationships other than price per ton of coal or gallon of oil have been
criticized as increasing the difficulty of comprehension by the average
consumer; I but research does not disclose any case in which such a
clause has been disapproved on that ground. Indeed, the tendency is
in the opposite direction.
The simplest relationship on which to base fuel escalation is the
price per unit of fuel. When generating stations were not readily
convertible from one fuel to another, this was fairly satisfactory. A
few fuel clauses are still constructed in this manner. In some cases
retention of this system is necessary because the utility is charged on
this basis by other utilities from which it purchases power. For
example, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation uses a price-per-ton
basis; "- accordingly, New York State Electric and Gas Corporation
uses the same basis in rate schedules for consumers whose needs are
met with power purchased from Niagara Mohawk.2 But in areas
where it generates its own power, New York State Electric and Gas
Corporation has advanced to the use of clauses based on price per million
BTU . 3
The same result is often achieved by indirection by referring to the
price "per short ton (containing 14,000 BTU per pound) in the average
delivered cost of coal," 94 or by defining a ton of fuel as "a quantity of
coal, or its equivalent, containing 29,000,000 BTU." " This calcula-
tion is some improvement. It permits the utility to use alternative fuels
without upsetting the rate provisions, thereby taking into account the
recent development of generating equipment capable of conversion from
one fuel to another." But it is only an intermediate step, since it does
87. Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp., 65 P.U.R. (n.s.) 198, 201 (Wis. 1946); cf.
Duquesne Light Co., 32 Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 129, 179 (1954).
88. Propriety of Fuel Clauses, MAss. DP'T oP PuB Um. No. 7357 (1946).
89. New York Edison Co., 10 P.U.1. (n.s.) 244, 260 (N.Y. 1935).
90. E.g., Pa., Pennsylvania Power Co., 69.
91. N.Y., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. 87 89
92. N.Y., New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 67.
93. N.Y., New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 42, 45, 51.
94. Va., Eastern Shore Pub. Serv. Co., 15.
95. Conn., United Illuminating Co., 145. The ratio of BTU per pound may vary
from 12,750 BTU (II., South Beloit Water, Gas & Elec. Co., 184) to 16,240 BTU
(R. I., Narragansett Elec. Co., 24, expressed as 32,480,000 BTU per ton).
96. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 45 P.U.R. (n.s.) 54, 59 (N.Y. 1942); New York
Edison Co., 10 P.U.R. (n.s.) 244, 260 (N.Y. 1935).
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not reflect increases in thermal efficiency of the generating system itself.
To do that, the base relationship should be expressed in terms of price
per kilowatt hour.
Of course, occasional revision of a price-per-BTU clause can keep
it approximately abreast of improvements. 7  But this method, while
eliminating the administrative time lag as a burden on the utility, tends
to overcompensate the company for cost increases, and therefore has
met with official disapproval in some cases." Recent decisions of the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission demonstrate the emphasis on
base relationships which afford recognition to increased efficiency. In
1951, the Commission approved a fuel clause with a fixed efficiency
factor-equivalent to a basis of price per BTU.9  Shortly thereafter
it required revision of a fuel clause, and included in the amendments a
factor based on the utility's efficiency experience-in effect, directing
use of a price-per-kilowatt-hour basis.' ° In 1953, it expressly directed
adoption of a price-per-kilowatt-hour basis.1"' Again in 1956 it dis-
approved a clause based on price per ton, directing that the clause be
either withdrawn or revised to reflect cost per kilowatt hour.02
In spite of such decisions, uniformity within the state is not to be
expected in the near future. Some clauses cannot well be changed,
inasmuch as they are correlated to those of other utilities.' 3 Even
without this consideration, the utilities within the state currently
use clauses variously based on cost per ton of coal,' per million
BTU,'" and per kilowatt hour.'
0 6
Two state commissions have attempted to obtain some measure
of uniformity in fuel clauses, without notable success. The Connecticut
proceeding has already been noted, together with its ineffectiveness
concerning experience factors.0 7 With regard to base prices its lack
97. Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Co., 65 P.U.P. (n.s.) 198, 201, (Wis. 1946).
98. Cf. Duquesne Light Co., 32 Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 129, 182 (1953), reznd on
other grounds, 176 Pa. Super. 568 (1954).
99. Duquesne Light Co., 29 Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 674 766 (1951), aff'd Sub
nonr. Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 171 Pa. Super. 187 (1952).
100. United Ice & Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 89 P.U.R. (ns.)
432 (1951), rehearing denied, 30 Pa. Pub. Util. Com'n 371 (1952), affd sub non.
Magee Carpet Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 174 Pa. Super. 438 (1954).
101. Duquesne Light Co., 32 Pa. Pub. Util. Conm'n 129, 182 (1953), rev'd on
other grounds, 176 Pa. Super. 568 (1954).
102. Metropolitan Edison Co., 13 P.U.R13d 29, 85 (1956) (The utility withdrew
the clause.).
103. Pa., Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 60. See text following note 90 .supra. The ill
effects of tampering with such a clause are shown in Boston Consol. Gas Co. v. De-
partment of Pub. Util., 321 Mass. 259, 72 N.E.2d 543 (1947).
104. Pa., Pennsylvania Power Co., 69.
105. Pa., Philadelphia Elec. Co., 93.
106. Pa., Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 82.
107. See note 73 supra and text at notes 69-72 suPra.
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of success is equally notable. Notwithstanding the Commission's
order that "the fuel adjustment clause shall provide that the cost of
fuel shall be the price per net ton of coal, or its equivalent, . "108
the state's utilities now use fuel clauses based on cost per net ton of
coal,'09 per million BTU," 0 and per kilowatt hour."' Massachusetts
has been more successful. Its investigation, unlike Connecticut's, was
conducted after the war. Like Connecticut, it prescribed that the base
cost be stated in cents per ton of fuel; but it went one step farther and
defined a ton of fuel as that quantity, whether coal or oil, which contains
29,000,000 BTU." 2 Today, virtually all Massachusetts utilities use
this base price; of the two exceptions, one refers to a price per ton
and thus may be in conformance with the uniformity order."-3 The
other adjustment is expressed in cents per gallon of oil." 4
TAx CLAusES
Tax clauses were first proposed some time after fuel clauses had
been authorized by several if not the majority of the states. Being
less imperative, they met with a less favorable initial reaction. The
Missouri Public Service Commission could say with impunity that al-
though a fuel clause was a virtual necessity it did "not believe that
. the item of taxes will be subject to such sudden and radical
changes that it cannot be provided for in the nature of a fixed charge
per kilowatt hour." 116
One of the earliest tax clauses was a private arrangement between
the utility and a municipal consumer, whereby the municipality agreed
to pay for water service a certain sum plus any taxes imposed on the
utility by the municipality. One suspects that the parties had desired
a tax immunity which was contrary to law and devised this method of
accomplishing the same purpose. If so, the outcome prevented the in-
direct achievement of that which could not be done directly; but this
does not appear in the report. Although the Public Utilities Com-
mission approved the contract, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that
the rate was unlawful." 6  The court's opinion, unfortunately, is not a
model of clarity. Indeed, it is difficult to determine whether the court
thought it unreasonable that the town, as opposed to its residents,
108. Uniform Fuel Clause for All Electric Companies, 54 P.U.R. (as.) 57 (1944).
109. Conn., Connecticut Power Co., 13.
110. Conn., Connecticut Light & Power Co., 1.
111. Conn., Mystic Power Co., 126.
112. Propriety of Fuel Clauses, MAss. DWT oV Pun. UTiL. No. 7357 (1946).
113. Mass., Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co., 62.
114. Mass., Hudson Light & Power Dep't, 229.
115. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 1918E P.U.R. 490, 511.
116. In re Caribou Water, Light & Power Co., 121 Me. 426, 117 Atl. 579 (1922).
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should bear the burden of future taxes imposed by the town, or whether
the possibility of variable utility rates in and of itself frightened the
court into rejecting the contract.17
The next proposal for tax escalation was made in 1933. This, too,
failed of approval, although not so crushingly as its predecessor." 8
There the matter rested for several years. Just how long, it is difficult
to determine. The Public Utilities Reports series includes no cases
involving tax escalation proposals between 1933 and 1941; but some
of the presently-operative tax clauses are stated as applying to increases
occurring after 1938,119 so that one must assume there were cases in
that period which were not reported. There is an alternate possibility,
however. In some cases the regulatory commissions have allowed pub-
lication of tax clauses without objection, relying on their general super-
visory powers to question the clauses at the time they become operative,
if ever. Thus in Connecticut, "although certain tax adjustment clauses
are on file they have not been and will not be applied without specific
authorization of the [Public Utilities] Commission."'20
This hypothesis might also help to explain the anomalous situation
in Wyoming. One utility there has a tax clause in all electric rate
schedules applicable within the state, providing for increases in rates
to compensate for "any impost, assessment or charge imposed or levied
by any governmental authority as a result of laws or ordinances enacted
after May 1, 1948." "' In 1956 the same company proposed a similar
clause in gas schedules. The state's Public Service Commission dis-
approved.
"Inclusions of such clauses in utility tariffs are a relatively
new innovation resulting from the fact that governmental units,
primarily municipalities, in their search for new revenue sources
have been turning recently to such taxes on utilities. To date we
have not had much experience with suchotaxes and pass-on clauses
and we are not presently convinced that such a clause in a tariff
is either desirable or adequate to achieve its purpose. Before allow-
ing such a clause we feel that we should have more time to observe
the effects of such taxes and assessments in Wyoming, and also
to observe the experiences of other regulatory bodies with similar
clauses." '
117. The Maine Public Utilities Commission adhered to the latter view. Portland
Gas Light Co., 69 P.U.R. (n.s.) 154 (1947); see CastineWater Co., 47 P.U.R. (n.s.)
522 (Me. 1947).
118. Newport Water Corp., 1933E P.U.R. 1, 24 (PLI.) (quoted at note 5 supra).
119. E.g., Kan., Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 63; cf. Lawrence Gas & Elec. Co., 38
P.U.R. (n.s.) 89 (Mass. 1941) (proposing substitute tax clause for one then in effect).
120. Letter from Daniel E. Ahearne, Ass't Sec'y to author, June 21, 1956.
121. Wyo., Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 26. The date varies from one schedule to
another, but in no case is it later than July 1, 1949.
122. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 13 P.U.R3d 523, 533 (1956). In October 1956
the Commission permitted filing of the tax clause in Montana-Dakota Util. Co. tariff
No. 1-2, original sheet No. 12-14, Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 15 P.U.R.3d 246 (1956).
1958]
984 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
Tax clauses are as varied as fuel clauses in form and applicability.
They are found in thirty-four states, compared to forty-four with fuel
clauses but including each of the four states without fuel clauses. They
apply to all classes of consumers in twenty-five of these states, although
in two states the clauses apply to all consumers in limited areas only.
They are applied in sixteen states to less than all classes of consumers
in a given area.
The forms of these clauses, though infinitely varied, may be
grouped into three or four categories. The most prevalent provides
for escalation in proportion to "any taxes or governmental impositions
which are assessed on the basis of gross revenues of the utility and/or
the price or revenue from the electric energy or service sold and/or
the volume of energy generated or purchased for sale and/or sold
hereunder." Is Basically, such a clause is designed to cover any taxes
imposed on or measured by units of energy or price. These are obvi-
ously the easiest taxes to prorate.
The next group of tax clauses are those designed to recoup local
taxes, imposed by local authorities or by the state legislature under
laws of local application. These provisions are readily justifiable on
the ground that the consumers in town A cannot be expected to
contribute toward the cost of a tax levied by town B on a utility serving
both localities. Such clauses may provide:
"Bills will be increased within the limits of any municipality
which levies special taxes, license and franchise fees, or rentals
against the utility's property, operation, or production and/or
sale of energy to compensate for such taxes, fees, or rentals." 124
In some cases tax clauses are published which refer to "any govern-
mental authority," but which are intended to operate only with respect
to taxes of local applicability. '
A few clauses refer to franchise taxes only, such as the Washington
utility schedule which provides for increases "to compensate for any
new Federal, State, county, or municipal tax . . . upon or in respect
of the right of the utility to operate or do business within the juris-
diction imposing the tax." '
123. Ariz., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 2. Some utilities include transmission as well
as generation, purchase and sale, and also taxes on meters or customers. Colo., Colorado
Cent. Power Co., 6.
124. Fla., Gulf Power Co., 39; see also Ill., Commonwealth Edison Co., 74;
Wash., Washington Water Power Co., 26.
125. This has been said to be true of the clause in Del., Delaware Power & Light
Co., 1 (telephone information from L. R. Leslie, Vice-President, Jan. 23, 1957).
126. Wash., Modern Elec. Water Co., 55; cf. N.Y., Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., 96 (taxes on use of Niagara River water).
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There are clauses providing compensation for all taxes other than
income or ad valorem taxes.' 7 And there are provisions covering all
taxes "imposed on the utility," m-8 "any new form of tax," 129 "any
new or additional taxes levied upon the company," 130 and similar
blanket provisions.".
Finally, there is one tax clause which is completely unique, on two
counts. First, it is the only tax clause which has an experience factor.
In all the other clauses there is a base date; but if taxes increase above
those in effect on that date, the clauses provide for immediate escalation.
Second, this unique provision is more than a tax clause since it is
pegged, not to a given tax level, but to a proportion of operating revenue.
The clause provides: "Bills . . . are subject to an increase of 0.1%
for each full 0.1% increase above 17.6% in the percentage ratio which
taxes bear to operating revenues for, the 12 months preceding the cus-
tomer's billing period." 132 Under this clause, consumers could be sur-
charged even though the tax statutes, including the rates therein,
remained unchanged. Consider, for example, the effect of increasing
business (and increasing revenue) under a graduated corporate income
tax.
Unfortunately, there is no published report involving the insertion
of this clause in the rate schedules; and the office of the Oregon Public
Utilities Commissioner, in reply to a general inquiry, made no reference
to it."a Such a clause has been the subject of only one reported case.
The Lawrence Gas and Electric Company proposed in 1941 that such
a clause (providing for recovery of all tax payments in excess of nine-
teen per cent of operating revenue) be substituted for the then-applicable
provision for recovery of payments for new taxes. The Massachusetts
Department of Public Utilities rejected this proposal, although recog-
nizing that tax increases were imminent, because it would enable the
utility to recover taxes "without striving to meet them either by effect-
ing operating economies or increasing revenues by increased sales. It
removes the incentive which the company otherwise has to seek tax
reductions." 134
127. E.g., Kan, Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 54.
128. Ariz., Citizens Util. Co., 45.
129. Colo., Walsenburg Util., 131.
130. Idaho, Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 1. Since prepa-
ration of this material operation of the service to which this schedule applied has
been assumed by Washington Water Power Co., whose tax clause is similar to that
at note 124 supra.
131. Me., Maine Pub. Serv. Co., 38; Mont., Montana Power Co., 7.
132. Ore., California-Pacific Util. Co., 9.
133. Letter from David Don, Chief Engineer, to author, June 29, 1956.
134. Lawrence Gas & Elec. Co., 38 P.U.R. (n.s.) 89, 90 (1941).
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This is as much analysis as any commission has given to tax
clauses. The majority of the opinions either accept or reject them
rather summarily. Michigan approved such a clause in a short-form
opinion; -'5 Massachusetts rejected one on stare decisis grounds
alone; 3'1 Pennsylvania held this was "not the only or best means by
which a public utility may be protected against increases in operating
and tax costs, which result from extraordinary or emergency con-
ditions," although no alternate means was suggested117 The Federal
Power Commission rejected such a clause without consideration on
the merits, because it might have violated an outstanding maximum
rate order; '3 a few months later it approved a similar clause without
discussion.'39
Tax clauses face every argument advanced in opposition to fuel
clauses, and one other. Such clauses, it is said, remove the incentive
to seek tax reductions.' This is not true in all cases, inasmuch as the
tax clauses relieve the utility of only the tax itself, and not the cost of
collecting it. Furthermore, the regulatory agencies which assert this
do not consider the question of whether it is advantageous to the
political community to have public utilities (or any industry) support
tax-reduction campaigns. That question, of course, is beyond the
scope of this discussion.
Jurisdictions such as Massachusetts 141 and Utah' which have
allowed fuel clauses but not tax clauses, can reconcile their rulings only
on the basis of comparative percentages of total operating costs. Logi-
cally, if one element of cost may legally be escalated, all costs may be
treated similarly. The Utah Public Service Commission acknowledged
this when it said:
"We can see no greater reason why any automatic adjustment
in the company's rate should be made to compensate for changes
in the price of coal than automatic adjustments to compensate for
changes in the cost of labor, material, and taxes." 143
The Maine Public Utilities Commission agreed.
"If this [fuel escalator] proposal is sound in principle, it
would be equally sound for this or some other utility to make use
135. Consumers Power Co., 39 P.U.R. (rs.) 130 (1941).
136. Buzzards Bay Gas Co., 79 P.U.R. (n.s.) 22 (1949).
137. Edison Light & Power Co., 44 P.U.R. (n.s.) 275, 276 (1942).
138. Tennessee Gas & Transmission Co., 69 P.U.R. (ns.) 48 (1947).
139. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 70 P.U.R. (n.s.) 129 (1947).
140. Lawrence Gas & Elec. Co., 38 P.U.R. (n.s.) 89 (Mass. 1941).
141. Worcester Gas Light Co., 9 P.U.R.3d 152 (1955).
142. Compare Southern Utah Power Co., 77 P.U.R. (n.s.) 109 (1949), with Utah
Power & Light Co., 95 P.U.R. (n.s.) 390, 399 (1952) (dictum).
143. Utah Power & Light Co., mipra note 142.
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of a similar clause with reference to labor costs, so that the rates
would fluctuate in direct proportion with wage adjustments.
) 144
ESCALATION OF OTHER COSTS
If the principle of escalation is established, and if (as these two
commissions declare) it applies equally to all elements of cost, why is
it not used with reference to labor costs, or even to operating expenses
generally? The answer, if there is one, is regulatory conservatism or
inertia. But it is submitted that such costs are presently subject to
escalation, and that the commissioners in Maine and Utah spoke truer
than they knew.
The Federal Power Commission lists escalator clauses in electric
rate schedules in ten states which are governed by costs other than fuel
or taxes. Three of these will be noticed only in passing. The Omaha
Public Power District provides for escalation based on total production
costs; 145 Dallas Power and Light Company and Minnesota Power and
Light Company vary their rates in accordance with increases or de-
creases in the United States Department of Labor "All Commodities
Index." 14 None of these utilities is subject to rate regulation, how-
ever, so the three clauses are of statistical interest only.
Of the seven remaining states, the most extreme escalators appear
in Florida. Two clauses in use there provide for a percentage increase
in utility bills for each increment of increase in the United States
Department of Labor index of commodity prices other than farm
products (or the Department of Commerce composite construction
index, depending on the utility publishing the clause) .147
Ohio boasts a clause providing for escalation in proportion to
"cost of labor including related costs caused by changes from existing
• wage or salary rates and benefits, at a rate of 0.25% per
$100,000 of change in taxes and/or cost of labor allocated" to electric
operations.'4  No experience factor is shown in the clause. It is
applicable in less than all the territory served by the utility, the area of
applicability having been reduced during 1956; 14' it applies to all
classes of consumers in the area where it is in effect.
144. Portland Gas Light Co., 69 P.U.R. (n.s.) 154, 157 (1947).
145. Neb., Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 135.
146. Tex., Dallas Power & Light Co. (subject to approval by the Dallas City
Council) ; Minn., Minnesota Co., 7.
147. Fla., Florida Power & Light Co., 1; Fla., Florida Power Corp., 16.
148. Ohio, Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 2 (issued March 31, 1956).
149. Compare Ohio, Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 1 (issued Sept. 1, 1956), with
Ohio, Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 2 (issued March 31, 1956).
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Five other states have escalator clauses so constructed as to include
in the basis some portion of labor costs. Thus in Arizona the escalation
is based on " 'average cost of power' . . determined by dividing
the sum of the total Yuma area electric department operating expenses,
excluding general expenses, overheads and fixed charges, by the total
kwh sold in the Yuma area." 1"0 Kansas Gas and Electric Company's
fuel clause includes in cost of fuel the "net cost of removing refuse, as
shown by utility's books." '"' A Missouri utility adjusts rates on the
basis of power cost, including "all production expenses (including de-
preciation of all generating plants) incident to generation of electric
power and energy by utility." "2 Two utilities in West Virginia have
clauses providing in identical terms for escalation on the basis of
production costs.' 3 All these clauses are applied to large consumers
only; experience factors include one month and twelve months, with
no specific period expressed in the Arizona clause.
Schedules of Southern Colorado Power Company include the
following "Tax, Wage, Commodity Price Clause":
"Utility reserves the right to increase the rates by not more
than 10% for that period during which its operating expenses are
increased beyond those incurred during 1941 by any cause beyond
utility's control, such as the effect of war, inflation, labor costs, im-
position and collection of new or greater taxes, license fees or gov-
ernment regulation, when such increases are over and above the
normal increase due to growth of utility's business.
"The basic percentages of operating costs (Exclusive of fuel,
excise taxes, and general officers' and executives' salaries) to gross
revenues from the sale of electric energy will be as follows for
each quarter calendar year:
Jan., Feb., Mar. 45.9%
Apr., May, June 46.5%
July, Aug., Sept. 45.0%
Oct., Nov., Dec. 44.5%
Utility may increase rates to the extent that corresponding current
quarterly percentages exceed these basic quarterly percentages." '5
While gas rate schedules have not been examined as thoroughly
as electric schedules, fuel and tax clauses are understood to be ap-
proximately as widely used in the former as in the latter. Of special
interest, however, is a "gas production cost adjustment" applicable in
150. Ariz., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 16.
151. Kan., Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 55.
152. Mo., City Util. of Springfield, 341.
153. W. Va., Monongahela Power Co., 13; W. Va., City of Philippi, 76.
154. Colo., Southern Colo. Power Co., 45.
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Delaware, computation of which includes labor and overhead costs
allocable to production rather than transmission or administration.
The clause embodies a twelve-month experience factory'5
This group of "production cost escalator clauses," as they may
be called, are the logical culmination of the escalator principle. They
are less understandable to the small consumer, perhaps, than the simple
fuel clause; but, as has been shown, this is no longer a viable argument.
Other objections to escalation apply to production-cost clauses with
the same force as to fuel clauses, except the argument that they allow
rate increases without consideration of all pertinent factors." 6 This
argument loses, as to production-cost clauses, much of the force it
had as to fuel clauses, because the production-cost clause compensates
for possible counter-fluctuations in prices other than fuel. Thus at
the present time production-cost clauses should receive more favorable
treatment than clauses pegged to less than all elements of production
cost.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS
It has been observed that most fuel clauses, and all of the produc-
tion-cost clauses, contain an experience factor; most tax clauses, being
related to taxes assessed on a per-dollar or per-kilowatt-hour basis,
lack this element. Where the experience factor is involved, the rate
adjustments normally take effect on bills rendered during the second
month after the price change which they reflect. Thus, if the experience
period ends on December 31, the rates will reflect that experience
beginning with February billings. The interval is allowed for two
purposes: computation of the adjustment, and its publication.
A delay of this length maintains the legal principle which prohibits
retroactive rate changes. During the intervening month the customer
will receive notice of the proposed rate, and has the privilege of either
filing a complaint with the regulatory agency or terminating his use of
the service, before he uses any unit of service for which he will be billed
at the new rate.
There are, however, clauses referring to a lesser time lag than
the case suggested. Many clauses refer to the preceding month, rather
than the second preceding month as suggested here. These would
appear to conflict with the principle that bars retroactive rate changes;
in practice many of them are applied as outlined above, so that the
155. Telephone information from L. R. Leslie, Delaware Power & Light Co.,
Jan. 23, 1957.
156. See text at notes 25-28 supra.
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conflict is avoided.' 57 In a few cases they are not so applied; rather,
the clauses state that the adjustment will appear as a debit or credit
on the following month's bill.'5 8 This clearly operates as a retroactive
rate change; yet there is in the reports no recognition of this problem,
and apparently no justification of the practice by special statute or
otherwise.
There are precedents for this. The United States Supreme Court
has recognized that rate changes may be made retroactive to the time
of filing of a request for increase,"" and Connecticut has declared
retroactivity to be permissible with specific approval of the Public
Utilities Commission.6 0 The Federal Power Commission has also
permitted retroactivity in utility rates, where they are changed in
accordance with an escalator clause made part of the tariff prior to the
effective date of the retroactive change.' Wyoming has approved
retroactivity even where no escalator had previously been filed, where
no other equitable apportionment of costs as between consumers was
possible."' Actually there is no real objection to retroactivity at least
where the consumer knew prior to the effective date that the rates would
be increased on the happening of a defined event. This presumably is
the theory on which the short-experience fuel clauses referred to
above '3 have been approved.
A few statutes, however, require that a public hearing be held
before any increase in rates is approved. The Illinois Public Utilities
Commission, interpreting a statutory provision that "no public utility
shall increase any rate . . . under any circumstances whatsoever,
except upon a showing before the Commission and a finding by the
Commission that such increase is justified," ' held:
"This seems to contemplate a formal showing which would
justify any increase allowed, and certainly does not contemplate
the allowance of an increase of rates predicated on the bare state-
ment of the public utility involved that it has paid a certain amount
for coal." "
157. Letter from E. M. Nicholson, Interstate Power Co., to author, Jan. 24, 1957.
158. Ark., Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 32 (large light and power schedule); Mo.,
Empire Dist. Elec. Co., 32-33 (lead and zinc mining and milling schedules). Cf. a
schedule providing that the cost of fuel shall be the average of fuel "on hand on
the first of the succeeding month." Ohio, Toledo Edison Co., 225.
159. TWA v. CAB, 336 U.S. 601 (1949); United States v. New York Cent. 1R.,
279 U.S. 73 (1929) (both cases involving mail pay).
160. Guilford-Chester Water Co., 1928C P.U.R. 545.
161. Gulf States Util. Co., 78 P.U.R. (n.s.) 21 (1949).
162. See Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 15 P.U.R.3d 246 (1956), and letter from
H. N. Elvig, Montana-Dakota Util. Co., to author, Jan. 28, 1957.
163. See text at note 158 supra.
164. ILL. STAT. ANN. § 8686(51) (Callaghan 1916) (subsequently repealed).
165. Rockford Elec. Co., 1917F P.U.R. 196, 201. But ef. Alton Gas & Elec. Co.,
1917F P.U.R. 12 (Ill.).
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The Indiana Public Service Commission reached the same conclusion,
although the statute involved did not specifically require a hearing.
"[I]t would appear that the Commission is without power
to confer authority for increasing rates contingent upon some
future happening, and that it would be necessary for the Commis-
sion to determine whether or not the price of coal had increased
or decreased. Therefore it makes little difference whether the
coal clauses are placed in the tariff or not, for the reason that it
would be necessary for the Commission, either on petition of the
consumer or the utility, to ascertain the prevailing price of coal
before allowing an increase or reduction in rates, on the theory
that no increase in rates can be allowed without a public hear-
ing." 166
There is no authority to the contrary, and it may be that the problem
raised by this type of statute can be solved only by obtaining the repeal
of the mandatory hearing provision. However, it is significant at this
point to note again that, notwithstanding such statutes, every state has
presently in effect one or more escalator clauses.
A more complex problem involves the requirement that utility rates
be filed for public inspection, usually thirty days before they become
effective. Whether, or to what extent, escalation violates the letter
or the spirit of these requirements has plagued the Commissions from
the beginning. The Pennsylvania Public Service Commission, in an
early case involving a street lighting contract, took the conservative
view.
"[An escalator] provision is not in and of itself objectionable,
but it is desirable to point out that it does not prescribe a rate or
constitute a tariff schedule; it merely, and perhaps quite properly,
reserves to the parties to the contract the right to vary the specified
rates dependent upon future changed conditions. It is expedient,
therefore, to direct attention that, in order to vary the rates as
contemplated in the provision referred to from those definitely
fixed in the contract, the light company must from time to time,
as changes are to be made, post, publish, and file, in accordance
with the requirements of the Public Service Company Law, tarifs
or amended tariffs, and therein definitely fix the rates to be applied.
"The Public Service Commission cannot, of course, pre-
determine the reasonableness or unreasonableness of such antici-
pated changes. 167
The Illinois Public Utilities Commission at about the same time
rejected an escalator clause completely, holding that it was in conflict
with the statute.
166. Indiana Serv. Corp., 1930B P.U.R. 278, 281, construing IND. ANN. STrATr. §
54-317 (Bums 1951).
167. Mercer County Light, Heat & Power Co., 1919A P.U.R. 907,
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"[T]he law specifically provides that the utilities shall file
schedules showing rates which are in force at the time for any
product or commodity furnished, or to be -furnished. It is the
obvious intent of the Public Utilities Commission Law to provide
that every public utility . . . shall have on file with the Com-
mission a complete schedule of rates from which its bills for service
may be accurately and definitely determined. ,, 108
A similar conclusion was reached in Maine."6 9
Other Commissions have taken a different position. They allow
the escalator clause to be filed, but require that whenever rate increases
occur as a result of the clause a new tariff or supplement be filed showing
the new rates. In such cases, the Commission normally grants for the
future the right to file such supplements on less than the statutory
notice. For example, the California Public Utilities Commission
conditioned its approval of a fuel clause on the
"requirement that the applicant shall file revised rates with-
in fifteen days after a change in the price of fuel oil which
would result in a change in the effective rates of the tariffs. More-
over, '. . . the new gas rates shall be effective beginning with
the bill based on the first regular monthly meter reading for billing
purposes which is taken on and after the thirtieth day following
such change in the price of fuel oil.. '
thereby solving, at the same time, the requirement of tariff filing and.
the problem of retroactive effect.7'°
New Jersey requires, in the case of gas distribution companies,
the filing of a tariff supplement on thirty days' notice, specifying an
effective date not less than seven days following the effective date of
the cost increase on which it is based.'7 ' In the case of electric com-
panies, tariff supplements were not required, but the utility was required
to file with the regulatory agency each month a verified statement
showing the prices paid for fuel, including freight, the kilowatt hours
generated, and other details of the fuel clause calculation.' 2
This is the intermediate solution. It has been adopted in
Illinois,'73 notwithstanding that jurisdiction's earlier holding that esca-
lation was contrary to the filing requirements of the Illinois statute; 174
168. Rockford Elec. Co., 1917F P.U.R. 196, 199 (in original).
169. Portland Gas Light Co., 69 P.U.R. (as.) 154 (1947).
170. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 99 P.U.R. (n.s.) 272, 287 (1952).
171. South Jersey Gas Co., 96 P.U.R. (n.s.) 71 (1952); see New Jersey Natural
Gas Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 249, 263 (1954).
172. Atlantic County Elec. Co., 1918B P.U.R. 589, 592.
173. Public Serv. Co., 1924B P.U.R. 386.
174. Rockford Elec. Co., 1917F P.U.R. 196. This section of the statute remains
unchanged. Compare ILT. STAT. ANN. § 8686(48) (Callaghan 1916), with ILL. ANN.
STAT. c. 111%, § 33 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
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it is also used in New York. 75 It was approved in Oregon, when that
state had tariff provisions similar to escalator clauses.' 78
Some Commissions go still farther, and require no filing at all
when escalator clauses operate to increase rates. 7  As the Wisconsin
Public Service Commission stated: "The company now submits monthly
reports which will provide the date [sic] required to check its operation
and which will allow the Commission to act promptly if changed con-
ditions warrant." 178 The same is true in Louisiana,17 9 Illinois,""° and
Wyoming.'- Commission orders approving escalation in Indiana,""
Massachusetts," m Maryland,' and New Mexico '1 are silent as to
any information which might be required, and presumably require
none.
This final step is actually unnecessary. The utility must perform
the calculation, and thus no substantial burden is involved in notifying
the Commission of the result; the filing of such information, on the
other hand, would be of great assistance to the Commission in super-
vising the rate level.
The regulatory agencies which have adopted either of the latter
two procedures--i.e., any procedure not requiring the publication of
increases by tariff supplement-have overcome the major apparent
obstacle to a real remedy by escalation, which is tariff filing require-
ments. The legal method by which this has been accomplished (and
it is a noteworthy accomplishment, eliminating the expense and delay
of formal tariff publication and notice) cannot be better stated than
in the words of Commissioner Catterall of the Virginia State Corpora-
tion Commission:
"That rate schedules are expected to contain such clauses is
recognized by § 56-236 of the Code of Virginia, which requires
every public utility to file its rate schedules with the commission,
and says:
Every public utility shall file with, and as a part of,
such schedules, copies of all rules and regulations that in any
manner affect the rates charged or to be charged.'
175. Brooklyn Borough Gas Co., 100 P.U.R. (n.s.) 271 (1953).
176. McPherson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 207 Ore. 433, 456, 296 P.2d 932,
943 (1956).
177. Wisconsin Michigan Power Co., 76 P.U.R. (ns.) 153, 155 (1948).
178. See text at notes 167, 170 supra.
179. Letter from James E. Reed, Jr., Central La. Elec. Co., to author, Jan. 22, 1957.
180. Letter from E. M. Nicholson, Interstate Power Co., to author, Jan. 24, 1957.
181. Letter from L. Duane Walrafen, Black Hills Power & Light Co., to author,
Feb. 5, 1957.
182. Southwestern Ind. Power Co., 71 P.U.R. (n.s.) 148 (1947).
183. Town of Westfield, 1919B P.U.R. 34.
184. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 1919A P.U.R. 66.
185. Community Pub. Serv. Co., 93 P.U.R. (n.s.) 18 (1951).
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"The legislature has, by the language quoted, recognized that
rate schedules consist not merely of lists of rates in dollars and
cents, but that they customarily include provisions that will in
various ways affect the rates charged at the time of filing or to
be charged thereafter.
"The next section of the Code, § 56-237, begins:
"'No change shall be made in any schedule filed pursuant to
the preceding section, including schedules of joint rates, except
after thirty days' notice to the commission, and to the public.
"The thing that the statute says must be filed is not every
change in the consumers' bills, but every change in the schedules
that affects the computation of the bills. A charge that can be
computed by a fixed mathematical formula is as firmly fixed as
a charge that is stated in terms of money." ...
The Federal Power Commission, while accepting the principle of
escalation, has not concurred in this last interpretation. It has ruled
that increases occasioned by such clauses are subject to the thirty-day
notice provisions of the statutes '.7 and also that they must be filed by
tariff supplement.18 The Commission has, however, permitted such
increases to take effect retroactively." 9
In jurisdictions where tariff supplements are required, escalator
increases are clearly subject to suspension; the increases may be sus-
pended also where they are allowed to take effect without filing a
supplement. The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities has,
in fact, suspended increases published in accordance with an escalator
clause previously approved by the Department. This act of suspension
was attacked on the ground that "approval of the department of the
filing of the original clause established the rate and that the department
had no power to suspend its application.. ." The Department, of
course, ruled that it had such power.190
But such power is rarely exercised. The Massachusetts Depart-
ment, in the same breath with which it declared its power to suspend
escalation, added:
186. Lynchburg Gas Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 33, additional opinion sub norn. Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., 7 P.U.R.3d 108 (1954), affd sub iwm. Norfolk v. Virginia Elec.
& Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 90 S.E.2d 140 (1955) (quoting Commissioner Catterall
with approval).
187. Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co., May 2, 1951, cited in P.U.R. Dig. 98 (Supp.
F 1953).
188. Gulf States Util. Co., 78 P.U.R. (n.s.) 21 (1949).
189. Ibid.
190. Worcester Gas Light Co., 9 P.U.R.3d 152 (1955); see also Virginia Elec.
& Power Co., 7 P.U.R.3d 108 (Va. 1954), aff'd sub ton. Norfolk v. Virginia Elec.
& Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 90 S.E.2d 140 (1955).
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"We think it no more than appropriate, however, to state the
policy of the department in this connection. Unless current figures
filed as part of the notice of increase indicate net earnings larger
than would be normally appropriate in the case of gas distributing
companies, the department does not intend to invoke its powers of
suspension and conduct a rate case in connection therewith." 11
Research discloses no case other than this one wherein escalator rates
have been suspended; and inquiry directed to numerous utilities has
failed to establish any such action by any regulatory agency.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
To what extent have statutory changes been necessary to legalize
escalator clauses? With one exception the answer is "none." The
exception is in cases where the regulatory statute required a hearing
before rates were increased.'9
Space does not permit reference to statutes of all the states; nor
would such a broad examination be of any appreciable advantage. For
convenience, this section will be limited to the statutes in those states
where existing escalator clauses recognize costs other than fuel and
taxes. These clauses have been previously discussed. 93
In Minnesota, Nebraska and Texas the rates referred to are
unregulated. Three of the states in question have statutory provisions
authorizing utilities to
"establish a sliding scale of charges, and . . . enter into an
arrangement for a fixed period for the automatic adjustment of
charges for . . . service, in relation to the profit to be realized
by such person. A schedule showing the scale of charges under
such arrangement shall first be filed with the Commission and the
schedule and each rate set out therein approved by it." '
Such statutes were probably enacted to permit other rate-making
methods than escalation,' 95 although they are broad enough in language
to include authority for escalation, if such authority is necessary.
The Ohio regulatory code specifically states that it does not
"prohibit a public utility from filing a schedule . . . providing for
(B) A sliding scale of charges, including variations in rates
191. Worcester Gas Light Co., supra note 190.
192. See text at note 164 vtpra.
193. See text at notes 145-156 supra.
194. ARIz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 40-368 (1956); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 115-3-6
(1953); Mo. ANx. STAT. § 393.130(4) (1952).
195. Such as that adopted in Indiana Gen. Serv. Co., 1920A P.U.R. 489, 498
(Ind.) ; see WELCH, CONDUCT ov THz UTILITY RAT CAsE 33 (1955).
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based upon stipulated variations in cost as provided in the sched-
ule. ,, . .
Florida has a very brief statute giving its Railroad and Public
Utilities Commission general power over all rate matters, but no
special authority exists for the publication of escalator clauses.' 97
The other three states in the group have regulatory laws patterned
very closely (in some sections, verbatim) after the federal statutes. 9
None of these laws contains any language similar to that quoted above
as effective in Ohio.
Based on these eight states, representing all sections of the nation,
the conclusion is warranted that escalation is possible without special
statutory authority. The regulatory Commissions have plenary power
over rates and tariffs, and can and do exercise that power, in the public
interest, to establish rates which are designed to keep pace with a
changing economy.
CONCLUSION
Every political jurisdiction in this country has escalator clauses in
the published tariffs of its utilities, although some of the clauses are
inoperative. Such provisions must be considered as departures from
the intent of the regulatory laws, which indubitably contemplated tariffs
setting forth rates in dollars and cents per physical unit. But they
have clear advantages. The obvious disadvantage, of leaving the
average consumer as ill informed of the exact method of calculating the
rate he pays as if no tariff were filed initially, is -far outweighed by the
advantages of flexibility, efficiency, and economy of regulatory ad-
ministration. This is particularly true since regulatory control has not
been in the least diluted by this method of rate making.
Another asserted disadvantage is that escalation removes from
utility management the incentive to use its bargaining power to keep
costs of operations at a minimum. This actually does not occur in
practice, because the delay between the payment of increased costs and
the reflection of those costs in bills to customers would reduce profits
as costs increase, and because in virtually al cases, escalation provides
less than complete compensation to the utility for cost increases. 99
Caution on the part of utility officials, and inertia within the
regulatory agencies, have probably both influenced the present limits
196. OHio Rzv. CoDm ANN. § 4905.31 (Anderson 1953). Similar provisions are
found in N.Y. PuB. SEarv. LAW § 65(4) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1147 (1941).
197. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 366.06 (Supp. 1956).
198. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 26, §§ 127, 151-57 (1953) (Section 127 includes power
to fix "special rates.") ; KAN. GxN. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-101 to 66-117 (1949); W. VA.
CODS ANN. §§ 2552-67 (1955).
199. See text and notes at notes 16, 17 supra.
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of the escalator principle. Certainly there is no logical reason why
some cost increases should have an automatic influence on utility rates
while others have none. Escalation clauses involving all costs of
production and transmission in a single formula are no more than
extensions of the principle recognized in Alton Gas & Elec. Co.2"'
Aside from caution and inertia, there is a political -factor militating
against escalation based on total costs. The customer of a regulated
industry has always been an interested party, entitled as of right to a
day in court even though he had no real understanding of the technical
issues involved. Escalation based on total costs has the effect of making
rates depend on facts presented to the administrative agency on an
ex parte basis, with no opportunity for most customers to examine or
dispute the facts so presented. Thus this proposition involves a limita-
tion on the rights of the customers.
So runs the theory. In practice, these rights of the customers are
rarely exercised except by associations, industries, or political agencies,
because of the small amounts of money involved for individual customers
and because of the complex and technical nature of the issues involved in
rate proceedings. As to these litigants, their nature and organization
place them in a position from which they are constantly informed of
the utility's situation, and from which they can, therefore, police escala-
tion clauses in spite of the ex parte nature of any changes in the rate
calculation.
Since this is so, the now virtually universal acceptance of escala-
tion based on certain cost elements should lead eventually to adoption
of this procedure on a broadened scale. The results will be reduced
costs of administration and litigation, greater correlation of utility rates
with general economic trends, and greater stability for the regulated
industry.
200. 1917F P.U.R. 12 (II.).
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